Are the Knicks overcompensating?

The New York Knicks are never short on critics; they may as well get royalties for the phrase "much-maligned."  So I'm typically hesitant to pile on them with the rest of the crowd—in fact I'm probably far quicker than most to defend the Knicks.  But the latest in the Knicks' ongoing series of blunders—namely, passing on Brandon Jennings in the 2009 draft and refusing to sign Allen Iverson after his release from the Grizzlies—have left me wondering:  Are the Knicks now so afraid of being the Knicks that they've done themselves in (again)?

For New Yorkers, the pain of the Knicks' recent history is that it has been a slow, steady accumulation of mistakes.  There's no one event so misguided as to stand out as the cause of their decline.  I suppose there rarely ever is a single moment that derails a franchise (maybe Herschel Walker for the World or passing on Michael Jordan), but it's the odd franchise indeed that can point to such a constant stream of gaffes as the Knicks.  After burying the payroll under contracts to Steve Francis, Penny Hardaway, and Stephon Marbury, sending two unprotected first round picks to Chicago for Eddy Curry (which became the numbers 2 and 9 picks in the 2006 and 2007 drafts), and becoming embroiled in a sexual assault scandal to boot, one can understand if the Knicks feel that they need a change of direction. 

And a change of direction is precisely what the Knicks have had.  For the past two seasons, Knicks fans have been told to wait; 2008 and 2009 will be bad, but they will be building blocks for the future, and the summer of 2010 will make it all worth it.  Isiah Thomas, who could draft unheralded talent but sure couldn't balance a checkbook, was excised.  James Dolan brought in Donnie Walsh who realized that redemption couldn't be bought in every off season—it had to be bought in the off season of the century.   So the Knicks displayed unusual resolve and launched a two-year assault on the Knicks' payroll to clear space ultimately for Lebron James (and maybe more) in the 2010 free agent market.  Contracts were jettisoned or otherwise allowed to wither away. And for once the Knicks seemed to be doing not only the difficult thing, but the right one.  The organization that once shelled out $30 million for a 30 year-old Jerome James finally realized that it had to pinch and save, sacrificing marginal success today for the prospect of real success tomorrow.

To a large extent Dolan and Walsh have the plan right, but in an ironic twist, they may have gone too far in exorcising the Knicks of old.  To be certain, gorging on the standard offseason fare would have been a tremendous mistake with 2010's offering of James, Dwyane Wade, Chris Bosh, et al. looming on the horizon.  But in scraping and saving for King James's contract, the Knicks forgot one crucial point:  the whole point of the plan is to win.  In what will be a stiff competition for James's services, that oversight might just sink the whole operation.  Indeed, New York dutifully ensured that they'd have all the money the Chosen One could want, but they failed miserably to put together the one asset that James may value the most: a team with championship potential.  I doubt it is easy to dump a decade's worth of bad contracts, get younger, and grow more competitive all at once.  But surely the Knicks realized that they'd need to spend at least some money to put together a reasonably competitive team.  Though spending nothing put the Knicks in the unique position of being able to potentially sign two of the biggest 2010 free agents, pitching that prospect to Lebron is nothing more than wooing him on a  contingency.  It's hard to say what exactly the Knicks should have done to suit their roster to James's eye (making a stronger play for Steve Nash might have been a start), but leaving Danilo Gallinari as James's primary running mate certainly wasn't it.  Looking at the Knicks current roster, and their current chances of landing James, one can't help but wonder if the organization is more interested in building a better team, or in "changing direction" no matter the cost. 

In the end, it's the Knicks' narrow determination to atone for the sins of their past that may do them in.  Which brings me back to their most recent mistakes.  Consider first the decision to pass on Brandon Jennings in the draft this summer.  So that our history isn't too revisionist, it's important to remember that Jennings was a giant mystery heading into the draft, both on the court (where he had just struggled in Italy for a year) and off (where he flat out refused to go to college and by high school had already cemented the nickname "Young Money").  But the Knicks needed a point guard and Jennings reportedly dominated their pre-draft workouts.  Scared off by his flash and brashness—two qualities that at one time may have attracted the Knicks to a young guard—the Knicks instead opted for Arizona power forward Jordan Hill, for whom their were no maturity questions.  It's hard to fault a team for drafting a player as highly thought of as Hill with the 8th pick in the draft, but that's cold comfort for the Knicks fan who turned on SportsCenter two weeks ago to see Jennings drop 55 points in his seventh game in the league.  Perhaps even less to the head coach who has made a career out of teaching point guards the freewheeling style that Jennings embraces so naturally.  But the real question is: since when do the Knicks pass on a potential superstar and an almost certain fan favorite because he might be too rough around the edges?  It seems the Knicks saw in Jennings something that reminded them a little too much of their recent past, and his gamble was too risky for a team mid-makeover.  Much like the reform-conscious Dallas Cowboys who passed on Randy Moss in 1998, one has to wonder how much the Knicks will pay for their reluctance in the years to come.  At least one possibility sticks out for now—it might cost them their most prized possession in 2010.

The Knicks' recent decision to pass on Allen Iverson seems driven by the same concerns.  Iverson costs money (at least for a season) and at 34 reminds the Knicks perhaps a bit too much of those Marbury/Francis/Quentin Richardson decisions of the past.  But in a city that has always embraced the street image and playground style that Iverson has virtually patented, one wonders what exactly the Knicks are running from.  Would Iverson solve the Knicks' problems?  Absolutely not.  But he would excite fans, sell jerseys, and, heck, win a few more games.  If the grand plan remains to build for the the future, perhaps the rebuff of Iverson is less damaging than the pass on Jennings.  In the absence of a Jennings or at least a Nash, however, it's hard to say that acquiring Iverson would cost the Knicks any development for the future—it's not like they have much to lose by Chris Duhon or Nate Robinson giving up some of their playing time this year.

These most recent mistakes are perhaps toughest to swallow because, for the Knicks, this is all supposed to be ending.  But Walsh and Dolan appear to have lost sight of what first propelled their rehabilitation project.  Scrapping cash and saving image were but means  to the only end that matters:  basketball success.  Unfortunately for their fans, the Knicks are instead more focused upon simply severing ties with the Isiah years.  For now, the goal is to rectify Isiah's directionless spending by successfully landing the king fish in the 2010 market.  If the plan works and the Knicks strike it big in 2010 (and for the sake of the league I hope they do), then Walsh and Dolan deserve all the credit in the world.  But if a once reasonable rebuilding plan has somehow blinded the organization to its actual needs, then it's once again time to reevaluate in New York.